This paper focuses on the problem of providing tolerance to both hardware and software faults in independent applications running on a distributed computing environment. Several hybrid-fault-tolerant architectures are identified and proposed. Given the highly varying and dynamic characteristics of the operating environment, solutions are developed mainly exploiting the adaptation property.
Introduction
General-purpose information-processing distributed systems have been widely used in many real-life applications [4] [18] . Such systems are often heterogeneous, containing computing nodes with very different characteristics which may be connected by different kinds of communication networks. In general, they are designed to support multiple independent applications that may compete for both hardware and software resources. Our study in this paper will focus on this type of systems, i.e. the distributed operating environment provides support for independent and isolated applications. Distribution in these systems is not a direct solution to dependability, and very high dependability cannot be achieved merely by simple backup or replication. The combined utilisation of a wide range of fault tolerance techniques is required, intended to cope with the effects of both hardware and software faults and avert the occurrence of failures or at least to warn a user that errors have been introduced into the state of the system [11] [23] .
The major engineering approach to the incorporation of fault tolerance into systems has long been to apply the most suitable and profitable fault-tolerant techniques to the different layers the system is composed of (typically, the hardware and software layers). By isolating the faults within every single layer plus a set of well-defined failures of the underlying layers, the provision of fault tolerance in each layer is often relatively simple and easy to control.
However, the need for developing a unified method for tolerating both hardware and software faults has been recognised in the last few years, and several proposals in this direction have already appeared in the literature ( [8] [9] [10] [14] [22] [24] ). The idea of implementing fault tolerance separately at the hardware and software layers of a computing system could result in a too weak approach. In fact, it does not cope with the relationships existing between the hardware and the software behaviour, and it may cause a loss of efficiency and performance because of possible overlapping of the fault tolerance techniques used in different layers. Runtime costs may be summed up resulting in a very high run-time overhead in a functioning system, especially in absence of faults.
Most existing studies assume that a fixed amount of hardware and system resources is bound statically to a given fault tolerant structure. The development of an architecture is thus completely isolated from the environment in which it is intended to operate. Therefore, their focus is restricted to the reliability aspects without any reference to considerations of performance and efficiency, which are doubtlessly of high interest when making a system design choice. In fact, in a distributed computing environment multiple unrelated applications may compete for system resources such as processors, memories and communication devices, thereby exhibiting highly varying and dynamic system characteristics. By focusing on this type of systems, in this paper we extend previous work on the topic of combined architectures for tolerating hardware and software faults and address efficiency and performance as well as reliability issues. In particular, the objective of our work is twofold.
First, we define several architectures by extending existing software fault tolerance schemes to the treatment of both hardware and software faults. The study of the approaches to software fault tolerance has recently made significantly progress. The important latest work includes both analytical evaluation [9] [15] [16] and experimental validation [20] [21] on the effectiveness of various advanced schemes and strategies. We distinguish between static strategies that always consume a fixed amount of resources and dynamic (i.e. adaptive) strategies that use additional resources only when an error is detected, in the hope that the resource utilisation and the response time will be improved. We are mainly concerned with dynamic strategies and two typical dynamic schemes are exploited -recovery blocks (RB) ( [17] ) and Self-Configuring Optimal Programming (SCOP) ( [5] ). N-version programming (NVP) ( [3] ) and NVP with a tie-breaker (NVP-TB) ( [19] ) are chosen as two representatives of static schemes for the sake of comparison.
Secondly, we introduce a method for analysing the proposed architectures with respect to reliability, resource utilisation and response time aspects, and give examples of quantitative evaluations. Given the very high complexity involved in an analysis based on a fully distributed, varying environment, we restrict the potentiality of such a varying environment by introducing a few assumptions, which might limit the realism of our analysis. Nevertheless, our analysis is a first contribution in the direction of evaluating a fault tolerant architecture under dependability, performance and efficiency aspects.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 several hybrid-fault-tolerant architectures are defined at the top of a distributed operating environment. In Section 3 the dependability of the architectures under consideration is evaluated based on a markovian approach. The proposed architectures are analysed with respect to resource cost and response time in Section 4. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
Architectural Solutions for Hybrid Fault Tolerance in a Distributed Environment
This section defines a set of architectures for hardware and software fault tolerance in independent and unrelated applications running on a distributed operating environment. Figure   1 shows the relationship between defined architectures, abstraction layers and the distributed system infrastructure. We distinguish two layers: software and system/hardware. The software layer consists of multiple independent and competing (fault-tolerant, or non-fault-tolerant) applications that may use different techniques to achieve fault tolerance, or other goals, while the system/hardware layer corresponds to a distributed operating environment that contains a set of computing nodes connected by a communication network 1 . The effects of hardware failures may be masked by fault-tolerant mechanisms and schemes applied in the upper layer, but the distributed environment is responsible for hardware fault treatment, including fault diagnosis and the provision of continued service.
Each of our architectural solutions is designed for a single application that runs concurrently with other applications on the same distributed environment. Several applications share the underlying computing environment and compete for the distributed system resources, but the applications are not necessarily distributed themselves. They make use of replicated hardware and software components in order to achieve the required levels of dependability. A single application that exploits an architecture must request processing resources from the underlying operating environment upon invocation and return them to the environment when the required computation terminates. During the computation, the application may apply for additional resources if necessary. For a given fault-tolerant application, an architecture contains i) a set of software variants designed independently (mainly for coping with residual design faults), ii) an adjudicator [2] (e.g. an acceptance test or voter) for the selection of an acceptable output from the results of those variants, and iii) a control program managing the execution of the variants and taking proper actions in response to the adjudicator output. The related 1 A "hardware" processing node or component is composed here of both the hardware and the associated executive software providing necessary services for the execution of a special application in the software layer, and it may have disks organized as stable storage.
programs and input/output data may be stored on the disks of some nodes. The architecture, or more precisely its control program, must guarantee that the state information and output results are produced dependably with a required probability so that they can be recorded correctly on stable storage. It is therefore its responsibility to perform error recovery in the software layer as well as to report faults to the environment.
In order to simplify the definitions and evaluation of the proposed architectural solutions, we introduce some assumptions that are common to all the architectures. An adjudicator is supposed to be replicated on all the hardware nodes supporting a specific architecture, but a selected node is responsible for taking a final decision from the local decisions and for producing outputs of the architecture. As it would be short and simple, the final adjudication is assumed to be highly dependable. Control programs are organised in a manner similar to the organisation of adjudicators. Correct software variants, although developed following the principle of design diversity, produce the same result when executing on correct hardware nodes and activated on the same input 2 . Copies of the same (faulty or nonfaulty) variant running on non-faulty hardware nodes produce identical results when activated on the same input. Finally, the possibility that two correct variants running on two faulty hardware nodes produce the same identical incorrect result is considered to be negligible.
We characterise an architecture with respect to three aspects: 1) levels of fault tolerance,
2) hardware resource consumption, and 3) response time. An architecture is denoted by a group of multi-elements X(F, N, H b , H max , ...) where X indicates a specific architecture for hybrid fault tolerance, equivalent to the name of the selected scheme for software fault tolerance such as RB and NVP; F indicates the number of (hardware-and software-) faults to be tolerated and is further expressed by a detailed form: (f, i, j) in which f is the number of hybrid faults to be tolerated, i is the number of hardware faults to be tolerated assuming perfect software, and j is the number of software faults to be tolerated assuming perfect hardware; N is the number of application-specific software variants;
H b is the basic (minimum) number of hardware nodes an architecture needs to achieve the given level of hybrid fault tolerance F; 2 Alternatively, the adjudicator is able to recognize and treat as identical the results produced by different variants which are correct, but different.
H max is the maximum (total) number of hardware nodes an architecture needs to achieve a given level of hybrid fault tolerance F when the worst fault situation occurs.
Due to the system-specific characteristics of response speeds (such as scheduling algorithms for resource allocation and mechanisms for remote access), we will not incorporate specific labels for response time into the X(F, N, H b , H max , ...) expression though we may add such labels to the expression whenever the need arises.
Although various architectural solutions could be constructed based on the chosen software fault tolerance schemes, we will restrict our interests to several particular instances with the form X((1, 2, 1), 2 or 3, ...). Since realistic examples of implementing software fault tolerance are most based on two or three software variants [14] , these instances have a more practical implication than other possible variations.
Dynamic Architectures

The SCOP Architecture
The SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4) architecture requests two basic hardware nodes and two further hardware nodes when a failure occurs in the software layer, as shown in Figure 2 .
Three software variants are distributed on, or made accessible to, these basic and additional hardware components. The adjudicator will decide in the end according to all the four results, seeking for a 2-out-of-4 majority. In case of 2 pairs of identical results produced at the end of the second phase, the adjudicator selects the result agreed by two different variants, given the assumption on the impossibility of hardware faults to cause two correct variants running on them to produce the same incorrect value. This instance of SCOP can tolerate one (hardware or software) fault at least. If no software fault manifests itself during computation, up to two hardware faults will be tolerated. Normally two different variants are executed in parallel on only two hardware processing nodes. In the presence of faults, the third variant will be executed in parallel with one of the other variants on two additional nodes requested, leading to a heavy increase in response time.
The RB-type Architecture
The primary variant V 1 in the RB((1, 2, 1), 2, 2, 3) architecture is executed on two hardware components (see Figure 3) , and the results produced by the replicated variants are compared. If they agree, acceptance tests are applied to them. This agreed result will be released unless both acceptance tests reject it. In the last case, an additional hardware node will be requested and the variant V 2 will be executed on it. If the results produced in the first phase disagree, a diagnostic routine must be applied to the two hardware nodes employed. If only one of the two nodes is diagnosed as faulty, then the result produced by the variant running on the non-faulty node is released, otherwise an additional node is requested to execute the variant V 2 . Note that, to tolerate the hypothesised faults, it is not conceptually necessary to check the result of V 2 , although the acceptance test would still be used in practice to detect more erroneous situations. However, in order to make a fair comparison between the different architectures and not to disadvantage any single one with respect to a specific aspect (e.g.
response time), we assume that the RB architecture takes the minimum measures just necessary for tolerating the hypothesised faults. This RB instance can tolerate at least one hardware or software fault. It is also highly efficient when no fault manifests itself during computation -the most likely situation.
However, the application that uses this architectural solution must be prepared to accept a rare, but still possible heavy degradation -the response time would be much longer while performing self-diagnosis and executing the variant V 2 in order to mask the effect of two hardware faults.
Static Architectures
The NVP Architecture
The 
The NVP-TB Architecture
The NVP-TB approach was introduced in [19] 
Dependability Evaluation
In this section, a detailed dependability analysis of the architectures defined in Section 2 will be performed adopting a Markov approach. There are only a few papers that have considered a combined analysis of fault-tolerant software and hardware [7] [13]. Laprie et al [14] conducted a dependability analysis of hardware and software fault-tolerant architectures adopting a Markov approach. Three special architectures that tolerate a single hardware or software fault were examined in detail. The approach reported in [8] used a combination of fault tree and Markov modelling as a framework for the analysis of hardware and software fault tolerant system. When a Markov model is used to represent the effects of permanent hardware faults, a fault tree model is used to capture the effects of software faults and transient hardware faults. Such a hierarchical modelling approach can simplify the development, solution and understanding of the modelling process.
In [13] [14] , the dependability analysis of hybrid architectures tolerating only one hardware or one consecutive software fault is conducted by first determining two models separately for the hardware and for the software and then combining the obtained results into a single model. We extend this kind of analysis by considering a different set of faults our architectures are to tolerate and by introducing a different model that allows to analyse both hardware and software faults in a combined framework. Our analysis starts from a set of special software failures that would lead to the failure of the whole architecture despite of the hardware conditions. Hardware failures are considered only when they affect the whole architecture alone or together with some software failures. The term adjudicator is used here to represent both the adjudication function and the control program.
Basic assumptions for our evaluation are as follows:
1) Failures of hardware processing nodes are independent; this is a reasonable assumption considering the nowadays well-established techniques for hardware design. The probability that correct software variants running on the failed hardware nodes produce the same incorrect outputs is assumed to be negligible;
2) Compensation among failures doesn't happen, neither between software variants, nor between variants and their adjudicator nor between hardware components and variants.
To make an example, if a majority of erroneous results exists, it never happens that the adjudicator errs such as to choose a correct result instead;
3) For dynamic architectures with multiple phases, the adjudicator exercised in more than one phase will show the same erroneous or correct behaviour throughout all the phases The adjudicator fails, selecting an erroneous result (given that an erroneous result has been produced) q vd A variant fails, given that none of the above events happens q iv
Given the existence of a majority, the adjudicator fails to recognise it (without releasing any result) q d
An hardware node fails during an execution, affecting the variant and/or the adjudicator running on it q h Table 1 Failure types and notation for SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4).
The detailed dependability model of the SCOP architecture is illustrated in Figure 5 .
This model is a slightly simplified one in which the states representing the execution of the second phase are introduced only when necessary in order to distinguish among different behaviours of the architecture. Table 2 VP two variants are executed on two nodes in the first phase; the arc from VP to F is labelled with the sum of the probabilities of the software failures causing the failure of the whole architecture without considering the hardware behaviour (i.e. independent failure of both the executed variants, and common mode failures between the variants and between the variants and the adjudicator) SP1 one of the two variants executes correctly while the other fails, and the second phase is performed SP2 the two variants execute correctly; 1) if the adjudicator fails to recognise the agreeing result, the second phase will be performed (unnecessarily); 2) if the adjudicator works correctly, the state representing the correct execution of the software components during the first phase will be reached Fv1 just one variant fails after the first phase; success or failure of the whole execution depends on the hardware behaviour throughout the two phases Ss in the first phase, software components including the adjudicator execute correctly; according to the hardware behaviour the final state S is reached or the second phase executed (states Fh1 and Fh2) Fh1 the second phase operates due to the failure of one hardware component during the first phase; success or failure of the whole execution depends on the behaviour of both hardware components and the software variants in the second phase Fh2 the second phase operates due to the failure of two nodes; success or failure of the whole execution depends on the behaviour of both hardware components and the variants in the second phase Table 2 Meanings of the states and arcs in Figure 5 .
By using the set of intermediate parameters shown in the right side of Figure 5 , the failure probability of the SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4) architecture is:
Similar models are derived for the other architectures. Owing to the limitation of space, we omit details of these models and show the solutions directly. Given the similarities between the operational behaviour of SCOP and NVP-TB, exactly the same reliability models and hence the same reliability expressions are derived for the two architectures. Note that Table 1 can be applied to NVP((1, 2, 1), 3, 4, 4) as well, while Table 3 introduces the relevant types of failures of software and hardware components for the RB((1, 2, 1), 2, 2, 3) architecture.
(Because of its extreme simplicity, i.e. comparison of two replicas, the failure probability of the comparator used by the RB architecture is assumed to be negligible.) By the use of intermediate parameters illustrated in Table 4 , the derived expressions of the failure probability The derived expressions are too complex to allow a precise comparison among all the architectures. As an example, Figure 6 gives a plot of the functions representing failure probabilities of the four architectures under consideration. To produce the plot, some numerical values are chosen for the dependability parameters, as listed in Table 5 . In this table, i) the acceptance test (AT) is assumed to have a higher probability of failure than the adjudicators used in NVP, NVP-TB and SCOP due to its complexity and dependence on specific applications; ii) a positive correlation is assumed between the failure of multiple variants resulting in identical or similar errors (and the same between the alternate and the AT in RB);
iii) the probability of independent failure of variants varies between 10 -5 and 10 -3 ; iv) the probability of hardware failure per execution is determined assuming that the probability of hardware failure is 10 -4 per hour (a usual estimation provided by manufacturers) and the time duration of a single execution is about 50 milliseconds. Table 5 Values of the dependability parameters used in the example.
Recovery Blocks NVP, NVP-TB and SCOP
It must be mentioned that these parameters values, although being reasonable values, simply constitute a line in the space of all the possible combinations. This doesn't allow to derive any general conclusion about the dependability of the four architectures. However, the example seems to be quite consistent with some intuitive conclusions. Since the influence of the hardware failure upon an architecture is relatively small according to the set of parameters chosen, it is the software behaviour that makes major contributions to failure of the whole architecture. Previous work in the literature has showed, for example in [5] , that there is no evidence that, in the general case, one of the RB, NVP and SCOP schemes is significantly better than the others from the dependability point of view, especially when comparable parameters values are used. This explains why the three curves appear very close in the figure although, we would remind the reader, the RB architecture needs perfect diagnostic routines. 
Resource Cost and Response Time
In this section the average resource consumption (i.e. the average number of hardware nodes required) and response time are estimated for each execution of a given architecture.
Average Resource Consumption
The SCOP architecture may require two phases. From the dependability evaluation of the architecture and using the same set of intermediate parameters, we obtain the probability that the architecture terminates at the end of the first phase:
Then, the average resource consumption by the SCOP architecture in one execution is:
Similar to SCOP, the RB architecture may consist of up to two phases and, equivalently, its probability to stop at the end of the first phase (including the case where it is necessary to run diagnostic routines) is:
The average resource consumption by the RB architecture in one execution is 1, 2, 1), 3, 4, 4) is not organised in phases -it executes all of its variants in parallel. Therefore it has a constant resource consumption that is equal to four, i.e., 1, 2, 1), 3, 4, 4) , although it stops as soon as two equal results are produced by two different variants, generally executes all of its variants in parallel 3 . Thus, in most cases it has a resource consumption equal to four:
NVP((
AV. RES NVP = 4 .
NVP-TB((
From this simple analysis, we can conclude that dynamic architectures have average resource consumption lower than static architectures. In particular, Figure 7 shows the plot of the average utilisation of processing nodes required by the SCOP and RB architectures during each execution as a function of the probability of independent failures. The same values already used in the previous section and reported in Table 5 are assigned to the dependability parameters. Again, the realism of such kind of evaluation depends on realistic values and ranges which must be derived for each individual realisation.
However, for most plausible values the probability that SCOP or RB stops at the end of the first phase is very high. This means that the average hardware consumption requested by these dynamic architectures is almost constant and very close to the amount required to start with. 3 Not all the variants are executed when the execution time of the variants is much shorter than the time necessary to require a processing node and the first two different variants produce equal results before the other variant(s) start(s) its(their) own execution. We will not deal with such a special case in our response time analysis, and assume the acquisition of all the necessary hardware nodes as a prerequisite for the execution of the software to be started.
Response Time
To better explore the behaviour of the proposed architectures under response time aspects, the response time analysis is conducted in two different scenarios: 1) all the processing nodes are required from the supporting system, and the proper software is then loaded on them before execution takes place; and 2) basic processing nodes required by each architecture are supposed to be pre-allocated and thus immediately available once the execution is invoked and only additional components need to be requested from the supporting system when necessary.
To analyse response time we will follow the same approach used in [6] [19] , but include times relative to acquire hardware components. It is assumed that the time needed to obtain the processing nodes and to load the software is an independent and exponentially distributed random variable W i with parameter λ wi . The execution times of different combinations of variant/node pairs are also assumed to be independent and exponentially distributed random variables E i with parameter λ i , particularly Y d with parameter λ d , for the adjudicator. Designating with Y c the duration of an execution of the given architecture without considering any interruption of the execution because of a watchdog timer, we will derive the distribution of Y c and its mean µ for the purpose of comparison. The probability p bt that an execution violates a timing constraint τ set at each invocation of a given architecture (that is, Y c exceeds τ)
can provide further information.
Dynamic Acquisition of Processing Nodes
In this scenario, the necessary processing nodes are first required from the supporting system, and the proper software is then loaded on them before execution takes place. Let Y w1 = max{W 1 
where p 1SCOP is the probability that the SCOP architecture stops at the end of the first phase. 1) equal results are produced by the two copies of the primary and the AT is executed (with probability p 1 );
2) after step 1), the third processing node is required to run the alternate variant (with probability p 2 );
3) different results are produced by the two copies of the primary and the diagnostic routine is run (with probability p 3 ); 4) after step 3) a third node is required to run the alternate variant (with probability p 4 ).
The probabilities of these events may be derived from the dependability analysis. So, the execution time Y c for RB becomes: 
Similar to NVP, the NVP-TB architecture requires four processing nodes, but its execution can stop after the first two results are produced by two different variants (without having to wait for the slowest one) if they are found to be equal (which happens in most cases, with probability p 1NVP-TB = p 1SCOP , as derived from the dependability evaluation). Here,
is the time for obtaining the first two results by two different variants, Y F2 = max{E 1 , E 2 , E 3, E 4 } and δ indicates the probability that the execution time of the slowest variant is equal or exceeds the time for obtaining two results plus an adjudication phase, that is, the probability that (max{E 1 
In order to give an estimation in a realistic situation, we now assign reasonable values to the timing parameters, as shown in Table 6 . In this table, it is assumed that software variants have similar distributions for the execution time. This choice brings special benefit to the NVP architecture which otherwise would show worse response time due to the necessary synchronisation with the slowest variant. The execution time of the comparator used by the RB architecture is lower than the execution time of the adjudicator used by the other two architectures since it is simpler to compare the results of replicas than of variants 4 . The probability that SCOP, NVP-TB or RB stops at some phase has been computed using the values reported in Table 5 and assigning the value 10 -4 to q iv . 
RB NVP, NVP-TB and SCOP
Table 6
Values of the timing parameters used, measured in msecs -1 .
Using such setting, we show in Figure 8 the plots of the pdf of Y c in the case of no timing constraints; in Table 7 a collection of the mean of Y c and the probability P bt (in presence of timing constraints) determined for some values of τ are given. In principle, results produced by different software variants could be expressed in different formats or considered as equal although they differ for a small quantity and so on.
When the time to acquire an hardware node is significantly longer than the execution time of a variant, dynamic architectures are better than static ones with respect to the average response time due to the lower number of nodes the former necessitates to start an execution (see Figures 8(a) and the first part of Table 7 ). In the case that the time for acquiring a node reduces to be equal or smaller than the execution time of a variant, the average response time is mainly determined by the execution time of variants and, with the parameters values chosen for this example, NVP-TB shows the best behaviour (see Figures 8(b) and (c) and second and third part of Table 7 ). In fact, in this case the dynamic characteristics of NVP-TB bring particular advantages to this architecture; the other static architecture, NVP, is instead the one showing the worst behaviour. The choice of identical (exponential) distributions for the execution time of the variants contributes to favouring NVP-TB (for example, the time for executing two variants among exactly two comes out to be significantly greater than executing two variants among four). Again, the results shown by this evaluation example are not meant to lead to definitive conclusions about the behaviour of the four architectures examined, rather to show how such an evaluation can be made; changing the distribution and/or the parameter λ i , could lead to different results.. Table 7 Some results of the timing evaluation with dynamic acquisition of hardware resources.
Static Allocation of Basic Nodes with Dynamic Acquisition of Extra Nodes
In this scenario, only additional processing nodes other than basic ones need to be applied for when necessary. Thus, NVP and NVP-TB do not suffer from any delay due to the acquisition of hardware components. Based on the same approach as for the analysis conducted in the previous subsection, the new assumption may have impacts on the duration of an execution of the given architecture, Y c , because it changes the calculation of the time W i needed to obtain the processing nodes and load the software. Without showing all the details (easily derivable following the analysis in 4.2.1), the new expressions of Y c for the architectures considered, adopting the same notation as in the previous analysis, are as follows.
NVP:
Y c = Y E + Y d = max{E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 } + Y d .
NVP-TB:
  Figure 9 and Table 8 show the results of the numerical example analyzed. Table 8 Some results of the timing evaluation with static allocation of hardware resources.
The evaluation here is based on the same values of the timing parameters already used in the previous evaluation and shown in Table 5 Notice that, in the table above, the figures for NVP-TB and NVP are exactly the same, independent of the different values for λ w ; for SCOP and RB the differences are not so relevant, since the contribution of the time necessary to acquire extra hardware resources is very small (i.e. the second phase is rarely executed).
Conclusions and Final Remarks
Several architectures for tolerating both hardware and software faults in a given application have been defined assuming a dynamic and distributed computing environment.
These architectures are classified as dynamic or static, according to their ability to adapt the execution to the manifestation of faults so as to minimise resource consumption and shorten response time. A method for evaluating the defined architectures has been developed with respect to dependability, resource consumption and response time aspects, and an evaluation using some realistic parameters values has been performed.
Although it is difficult to derive precise and definitive conclusions on dependability and efficiency in the general case due to many dynamic factors of the operating environment under consideration and the difficulty in obtaining sound estimates for the parameters values, the analytical results show that: a) under reliability aspects the four architectures proposed have comparable figures; b) dynamic architectures have better resource utilisation than static ones; c) dynamic architectures often have a longer worst-case response time, although for specific parameters settings they may have a higher probability of making a timely response than static designs, as shown by some of the examples made.
The present work has been developed under simplified assumptions, which may limit the realism of the analysis performed. Although it is necessary to go further trying to relax such assumptions in order to gain in usability of the method with respect to concrete applications (and we plan to proceed in this direction, for example releasing the assumption that the execution time of software components is independently and exponentially distributed), our contribution with this work consists in developing a first framework where dependability, performance and efficiency aspects of hybrid fault tolerant architectures are collectively considered. 
